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What Cost Naturalism?
Martin Stokhof & Michiel van Lambalgen*
The paper traces some of the assumptions that have informed conservative natu-
ralism in linguistic theory, critically examines their justication, and proposes
a more liberal alternative.
1 Introduction
In this paper we take up an issue that was touched upon in our earlier paper on
abstraction and idealisation in linguistics1 only in passing, viz., what we there
called ‘the ideological nature’ of certain views about the nature of linguistics as
a scientic enterprise. The choice of the term ‘ideological’ has confused some
readers and may have been less fortunate. But apart from the choice of appropriate
terminology, there is, we feel, an important issue here, one that needs further
investigation. This note is a rst step.
What is the issue? To put it in general terms, many approaches in modern
linguistics are characterised by an, implicit or explicit, commitment to a concept of
language that views it as the kind of natural phenomenon that can be studied
by scientic means, with the natural sciences (physics, biology) acting as role
models for what proper scientic theorising looks like. Language here is an
ontologically homogeneous phenomenon that, in principle, can be captured and
explained completely in, broadly speaking, physicalistic terms.
The original remark about the ideological nature of this view is motivated by our
concern that it is insuciently based on a prior and independent conceptualisation
of what language is and what an explanatory theory of it would need to account for,
* We would like to thank the participants in the workshop and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments and criticisms.
1 Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a).
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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with only subsequently an argumentation that such goals can actually be achieved
best by a physicalistic theory. Rather, it seems, the reverse has taken place. With
the choice of a particular type of theory already in place, the concept of language
has been adjusted and changed so as to t the pre-conceived idea of what a proper
theory of language should look like. But such a move can only be inspired by
the idea that only the type of theoretical explanation that we know from the natural
sciences can count as a proper account of whatever phenomenon we are dealing
with. And that, we venture to claim, is not motivated by argument but by ideology.
In order to make good on this claim, we need to do a number things. First of all,
we need to provide evidence that this kind of reasoning is indeed used in discussion
about what the nature of linguistics is. Second, we need to show that this leads
to the ontological homogenisation that we claim it does. That should settle the
‘ideology’ claim. But if, thirdly, we also are able to show that the resulting picture
is decient, both descriptively and explanatorily as well as philosophically, our
investigation will also be able to provide some support for alternative conceptions
of language and for other ways of doing linguistics.
2 A quick exploratory dig
One prevalent view on naturalism as applied to linguistics, to which we will turn in
the next section, is, we venture, a reection of what one might call ‘Chomsky’s
shadow’, a result of the deep and still present inuence of some key assumptions
that were infused in modern linguistics with the advent of generative grammar.
There are many such elements that continue to shape theoretical thought in the
discipline, here we focus on two that we think are directly relevant for the topic of
this paper, viz., individualism and the adoption of a particular type of explanation.
We realise of course that what follows is only a very rough sketch, one that
traces one particular way of thinking, and that does not do justice to some of
the alternative approaches that have been developed.2 Nevertheless, we do think
that the underlying assumptions that we discuss are not operative only in one
particular paradigm, but that they are around in other frameworks as well.3
2 Such as various approaches in functional linguistics and cognitive linguistics. Cf., e.g., Givon (2013)
for some discussion of the assumptions underlying functional linguistics that is congenial with
the argument developed in this paper.
3 Cf., below, footnote 13 and 22 for two examples from dierent frameworks.
92
What Cost Naturalism?
The individualism that is part and parcel of many approaches in linguistics, past
as well as present, can be stated succinctly as follows: ‘language is an individual
asset, and linguistic ability is an individual property’. The assumption is that in
principle, though not de facto, an individual could be a competent language user all
by his- or herself. Or to put it slightly dierently, in giving a description of what
linguistic ability is, and in giving a description of what that ability is about, viz.,
language, there is no need to refer to anything over and above the individual itself.
Language use may be a social art, but language itself and the ability to use it are not.
Of course, in real life people do not become language users in complete isolation,
nor do they function as such without being part of a social environment. But, or so
the idea goes, ‘in principle’ these social aspects can be bracketed, at least if they
themselves are not a topic of study, of course. With regard to individualism, then,
the basic divide is not between theories that leave out the social (communicative)
dimension as a proper concern for linguistics and theories that include it, but
between those that assume that the social dimension can be viewed in terms of
the interplay of individual abilities and those that do not view the individual ability
as an independent and foundational element.
The second factor that we want to draw attention to is the reliance on a particular
form of explanation. There is a tendency in many linguistic theories to assume
that explanations of linguistics facts ultimately need to be stated in terms of
structural properties, of language, grammar, and of individual language users.4 This
inspires an exclusive focus on structural properties of the human cognitive make-
up, ultimately, those of the human brain. This notion of a structural explanation is
familiar from the sciences. However, in the case of linguistics actual access to
such underlying structural properties never was a substantial part of the enterprise:
it remained, rather, an assumption that such access would be possible, i.e., it was a
way of formulating explanations, rather than a way of explaining things. This is
what Ernan McMullin called ‘hypothetico-structural explanation (McMullin 1978,
p. 139):
When the properties or behaviour of a complex entity are explained by alluding
to the structure of that entity, the resultant explanation may be called a structural
one. [. . . ] Such explanations play only a small role in scientic enquiry. Much
4 This is not to say that the resulting theoretical frameworks will be the same: what counts as the
relevant structural properties, what form the system takes, what role semantics and pragmatics
have to play in an overall account, are some of the parameters along which dierent approaches
distinguish themselves.
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commoner are those where the structure is postulated to account for the observed
properties or behaviour of the entity under investigation. [. . . ] [These] could be
called ‘hypothetico-structural’.
When individualism and the concept of hypothetico-structural explanation are
combined the distinction between competence and performance that has been
enormously inuential, and not just in the generative grammar tradition,5 seems
almost self-evident. And with that the rst, decisive step on an ever more abstract
construction of the central object of linguistics is taken that we know from the
generative tradition: from actual languages, as used in the ‘here-and-now’, to the
concept of ‘possible human language’, and then to that of ‘universal grammar’
and ultimately the ‘faculty of language in the narrow sense’.
Of course, not all linguistic theories have been travelling that far on the road of
abstraction, but many of them have been, and still are, aected by this powerful
combination of assumptions.
3 Abstraction and idealisation, once more
Now, one could regard the movement just described also in a positive way, i.e.,
as a manifestation of the increasing maturity of linguistics as a scientic enterprise.
And it has been presented as such in the literature. After all, no scientic discipline
engages directly with the continuous stream of experiences of phenomena that we
have, they all construct their object of investigation from the endless particularities
of phenomena by focussing on what is deemed important and leaving out the
rest. Thus any discipline needs to create from the experiental ux a more or less
stable set of entities that it aims to investigate.
That much is certainly true, and it is something can be observed in any scientic
discipline (as well as in many other branches of human cognitive activity, by the
way.) But as we have argued elsewhere,6 there are crucially dierent ways of doing
this, that have substantially dierent implications for the relationship between
what a discipline is concerned with and the phenomena themselves.
Very briefly, in the paper just referred to, we made a distinction between ‘abstrac-
tion’ and ‘idealisation’, and characterised the difference in broad terms as follows.
5 It was also a formative element in the development of formal semantics, for example.
6 Cf., Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a, 2011b).
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Features of a phenomenon that are abstracted are real features that at some
point in time are considered to be too complex or too intractable, or, in some
cases, not suciently relevant, to be taken into account in conducting a scientic
inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. A decision to abstract away from
a feature is thus context-dependent and reects various types of constraints that
may obtain at a particular moment in time, relating to the availability and accuracy
of instrumentation, availability and access to data, and so on. What needs to
be pointed out is that abstraction is an intentional move: the features that are
abstracted from are acknowledged as real, and they do occur, albeit in a special way,
in subsequent theories, and, being actual features of the phenomenon, they will
manifest themselves in experiment and observation. That holds, of course, also for
features of a phenomenon that have not been acknowledged as such, i.e., features
that have not been observed. These play a role in experimental and observational
results as well, but they are not intentionally left out of the theory. They are simply
not taken into account because they have not been observed.
Features that are abstracted from are typically quantitative in nature, and often
they concern the numerical value of something that is known to exist, but dicult,
or in some cases not particularly relevant, to measure precisely. Examples for
the natural sciences would be movement on a frictionless plane; the concept
of a perfectly rigid rod, or of perfect vacuum; free space constants, such as the
gravitational and magnetic constants; or the concept of a perfectly pure chemical
substance. In each of these cases there is a quantitative parameter (friction, the
number of molecules in a certain volume, etc) that is set to a particular value (zero,
innity, or a specic number, as the case may be), not because that value is known,
which it isn’t, but because it is too dicult or too unimportant to actually measure.
What should be kept in mind is that although abstracted from, these parame-
ters not only do turn up in experiment and observation they also are essential
ingredients of the theories that are based on them. If we described the movement
of an object on a frictionless plane, we are not assuming that friction does not exist;
we’re only setting its value to zero. That is of crucial importance because it implies
that there will always be discrepancies between the predictions made by a theory
that is based on the abstraction and what we can observe in the laboratory or
in the real world. And it are such discrepancies as we would be able to observe
and eventually measure, e.g., when better or new instruments become available,
that will allow us to provide richer and better theories that rely on less abstractions.
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Thus in the case of abstraction there is always a ‘back-and-forth’ between the
theory based on an abstraction and the real phenomenon as it manifests itself
in experiment and observation. And it is this back-and-forth that allows, and,
in some cases, forces us to ‘undo’ the abstraction and come up with a better theory.
So the motivation for abstraction is primarily methodological (in a fairly literal
sense, as ‘having to do with what methods we have at our disposal’) and practical,
and hence in principle always temporary and revisable.
What about the second way of constructing an object of investigation, viz.,
‘idealisation’? The dierence with abstraction is that here features that are ‘idealised
away’ literally disappear from view. These are features of the phenomenon that
are considered to be irrelevant from the perspective of what the discipline is
interested it. Hence an idealised feature no longer plays a role in the empirical
investigation: it is declared unnecessary to be considered further. The dierence
with abstraction may be subtle, but is it fundamental: an idealised feature is not
‘merely’ too complex or intractable, or not relevant in a specic use case, rather,
it is viewed as something that need not be considered in, and may even stand
in the way of, an attempt to understand the phenomenon since it is irrelevant
for acquiring such an understanding.
Thus idealisation creates an ontological gap between phenomenon and con-
structed object: an idealised feature is, of course, a real one at the level of the
phenomenon, but it is no longer present in the constructed object and has no
role to play in the subsequent theories that employ that object. In a quite literal
sense idealisation is an ontological move, rather than an epistemological one like
abstraction: it changes the subject.
Features that are idealised are typically qualitative features of the phenomenon.
Examples from linguistics that suggest themselves are: language as an innite
set of sentences; the competence – performance distinction; or the concept of
literal meaning. In each case there is a particular feature of actual language use
(e.g., its dependence on non-linguistics aspects of context, or the limitations of
cognitive processing power, and so on) that is being discarded. As a result a new
concept is formed that lacks this feature, and thus constitutes a dierent kind
of entity than the original phenomenon.
Take the rst example: if we look at languages in the ‘here-and-now’, i.e., as the
phenomenon that we actually encounter when people use language, it is obvious
that it is a nite object. The total number of utterances of any natural language,
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past, present and future, is nite, as is the existence of the human species. What is
important is that this nite number of utterances appears to be unpredictable in
this sense that we constantly encounter utterances of new expressions and that we
have no reason to assume that this is bounded purely quantitatively (i.e., there
there is some xed n that serves as the upper bound of the number of utterances we
may encounter). Thus ‘creativity’ of language use/users is a real phenomenon,
one that needs to be accounted for. What is important to note is that this creativity
in fact is bounded: it does not mean that anything goes and that there are no
restrictions, e.g., on the length or the complexity of the structure of utterances
(especially embedding) that are operative
And this is were things go wrong. The preferred way of accounting for creativity
is to drop the actual feature of language’s niteness and switch to a dierent concept
of language that identies a language with an innite number of expressions.7
But this is an ontological switch that is underdetermined by the observed creativity,
and that turns a fact to be explained into a dening feature, and thereby changes
the phenomenon that we observe into a dierent type of entity altogether.8
This also means that with idealisations there is no straightforward ‘back-and-
forth’ between the theory containing the idealisation and the actual phenomenon
as it appears in experiment and observation. Since the idealised feature is missing
from the theory, there is not direct relation between what we learn from experiment
and observation and the predictions made by the theory. There is an ontological
gap, and that gap needs to be bridged by an additional ‘bridging theory’ that relates
what the theory says to what is actually out there. That means that idealisation
comes with an additional epistemological task, viz., to come up with an adequate
bridging theory. How to do that is not at all obvious, however, especially because
the adequacy criteria for such a theory seem hard to come by.
So unlike abstraction, which is clearly motivated by practical and methodological
concerns, the motivation for idealisation is dierent: it does not derive from
empirical considerations, but rather is motivated by conceptual-philosophical
ones. Where these are based on pre-conceived ideas about what constitutes a
proper scientic investigation, –and as we shall argue, such ideas are indeed
7 A move that is inspired by the concept of a language that comes from the deductive sciences.
8 For another example, viz., the celebrated ‘competence – performance’ distinction, cf., Stokhof &
van Lambalgen (2011a, section 8).
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behind idealisations that we nd in linguistics,– they can be properly be called
‘ideological’.
4 Naturalism in linguistics: a specic case
Before turning to a more general outline of naturalism in linguistics, we rst briey
discuss a specic way of arguing for this general view. It draws on the work of
Chomsky, arguably one of the most inuential thinkers in this area, and not just in
the generative tradition.9 Chomsky has argued extensively that linguistics is a
science like other sciences, and hence that it should follow the same leads in the
construction of its objects as well as in the methodologies it employs in studying
them. That means not only that linguistics should be held to the same standards as
any other empirical discipline, but also that it should be judged by similar criteria.
This, Chomsky claims, is not always the case, especially in philosophy, where what
is accepted as normal and appropriate in the other sciences is judged by other
standards if it occurs in linguistics (Chomsky 1995, p. 7):
[...] it is a rare philosopher who would sco at its [i.e., physics’,ms-mvl] weird and
counterintuitive principles as contrary to right thinking and therefore untenable.
But this standpoint is commonly regarded as inapplicable to cognitive science,
linguistics in particular. Somewhere between, there is a boundary. Within that
boundary, science is self-justifying; the critical analyst seeks to learn about the
criteria for rationality and justication of scientic success. Beyond that bound-
ary, everything changes; the critic applies independent criteria to sit in judgment
over the theories advanced and the entities they postulate.
The message here is clear. According to Chomsky philosophers accept what is done
in physics and related areas of research at face value, and they study it in order to
understand it the way it is. But when it comes to linguistics and similar disciplines
the subject matter is not studied ‘as is’, but it is judged, and apparently by criteria
that are germane to the disciplines in question.
9 The ‘present relevance’ of Chomsky’s thought is a matter of debate. It is certainly true that the
landscape of theoretical linguistics is much more heterogeneous now than it was in the sixties,
seventies and eighties of the previous century. And many approaches are self-proclaimed ‘non-’ or
even ‘anti-’Chomskyean. However, there is still a strong tradition in theoretical linguistics that
subscribes to some of the fundamental principles discussed here. Cf., below for some examples.
And we would claim that even in alternative theoretical approaches one can nd assumptions that
derive from the generative tradition. For more discussion and concrete examples, cf., Stokhof &
van Lambalgen (2011b, pp. 80–85).
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But clear as it is, what Chomsky claims here is not beyond dispute. There is
a lot of critical discussion of various aspects of physics, or at least of the conceptual
understanding of it, both in philosophy as well as in physics itself. The ongoing
debate on the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics immediately comes
to mind (and we will see a bit of that later on), but also more generally there
is critical engagement with the natural sciences and their self-understanding.10
So it is denitely not true that philosophers do not criticise basic concepts and
fundamental principles in the sciences.
Likewise, the charge brought against philosophy that it judges linguistics by
‘outside’ criteria does not seem completely justied either. Of course, as in any area
of investigation, here too there is no doubt that examples can be found of analyses
and criticisms that are ‘o the mark’. But that is not particularly interesting.
Rather, what Chomsky seems to take issue with is criticisms that start from other
assumptions regarding what is the proper methodology in linguistics than he
deems relevant, and that hence accept methodological pluralism. This is mocked
by Chomsky as follows (Chomsky 2000, p. 76):
We must abandon scientic rationality when we study humans ‘above the neck’
(metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this unique domain, imposing
arbitrary stipulations and a priori demands of a sort that would never be contem-
plated in the sciences.
It is here that a central element of Chomsky’s particular form of naturalism comes
to the fore. As the passage just quoted strongly suggests, there is, according to him,
no special methodology that needs to be employed when studying the human
mind, including language. Such an assumption can only lead to ‘mysticism’, not to
explanatory theories. Rather, there is every reason to extend the methodology
employed in the study of humans as physical (biological) entities to the study
of mind and language.
Thus it appears that Chomsky’s main gripe with his philosophical opponents is
that they do not share his assumption that, linguistics being an empirical discipline,
it should employ the same methodology as any other empirical science, i.e., that
they do not, as he does, subscribe to methodological monism.11
10 A nice example is Hartry Field’s discussion of the role of mathematics in physics (Field 1980); an
example in biology is the debate concerning the unit of selection in evolution.
11 That Chomsky’s ideas are still with us is testied by the way in which the nature and goals of
linguistic theory are described in more recent work. Here is an example from Culicover and Jackendo
(Culicover & Jackendo 2005):
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5 Naturalism in linguistics: three characteristics
The methodological monism that we identied in the previous section as the rock-
bottom of Chomsky’s distinct view on the nature of linguistics, is an important
characteristic of a naturalistic stance in linguistics (as it is in many other disciples).
In this section we briey review three distinct such characteristics. Of course,
in real life naturalism comes in many dierent forms and guises, and with dierent
motivations and justications. However, we do claim that these three features are
characteristic in the sense that they can be found, perhaps in mixed composition,
i.e., with dierent emphasis and motivation, in most naturalistic views.
The three characteristics are methodological monism, already introduced; onto-
logical monism; and explanatory monism. The rst is the assumption that all of
science employs the same methodology. This should be read in a broad sense, since,
obviously, not all concrete methods are equally relevant, or even applicable in
every discipline. The second characteristic embodies the conviction that there
are no major distinct ontological categories, i.e., that everything is basically made
of the same ‘stu’. Again, this is a claim that should be interpreted with some
caution, it is not necessarily a denial of any form of categorial distinction between
entities, but embodies the claim that all of them are part of the same ontology.
The third characteristic, nally, comes with the claim that there is one model of
explanation that ts all phenomena, i.e., that all scientic disciplines employ the
same requirements for what constitutes an adequate explanation of the phenomena
that constitute their subject matter.
The relations between these three characteristics are complex. It is important to
note that they are not merely three sides of one and the same (thick) coin, i.e., they
do not imply one another. For example, one could subscribe to ontological monism,
We begin a more thorough examination of the situation [in syntax, ms-mvl] by reviewing
the rst principles of generative grammar, articulated in detail by Noam Chomsky in
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) and many subsequent works. With only minor
modulation and reinterpretation, these principles have stood the test of time and have
received further conrmation through the ood of research in cognitive science in the
past forty years. [. . . ] Generative grammar is grounded in the stance that the object of
study is the instantiation of language in the context of the human mind/brain, rather than
an abstract phenomenon that exists ‘in the community’ [. . . ] The fundamental linguistic
phenomenon is a speaker producing an utterance that is understood by a hearer, and the
fundamental question is what is present in the speaker’s and hearer’s mind/brain that
enables this interchanges to take place.
From there Culicover and Jackendo proceed to identify ‘productivity’ and ‘competence’ as core
concepts.
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yet acknowledge distinctly dierent methodologies as required by dierent sets of
ontologically non-distinct phenomena. What does follow is that in such a case the
motivation for the methodological pluralism can not be ontological. But other
justications can be thought of.
Of course, despite the conceptual independence of these three forms of monism,
there are in fact strong anities between them, and people tend to embrace them
as a kind of package deal. But their unication does require some additional
assumptions. One such assumption that enables further identication of these three
forms of monism is that nature is material. Ontological monism then entails that all
entities are material, which in its turns lends much plausibility to methodological
monism: if what we study is basically of the same kind, then obviously the same
methodology applies across the board (of disciplines, not entities). A further
assumption then comes into view, viz., that there is a basic level of material
constitution at which all relevant phenomena can be studied. This reductionism
then further motivates explanatory monism: if what we study with the same
methodology takes place at the same level of material constitution, how could
the explanations we are after be dierent?
Thus arises the idea of a unied science, based on material reductionism. With
physics arguably being the most successful science we have, it would stand to
reason that this unied science employ the methodology of physics, and if we
accept that, we nd ourselves engaged with some form of physicalism.
In order to make this a plausible account for linguistics, we actually also need as
some form of (methodological) individualism as an additional assumption. This
individualism was identied in section 2 as one of the core contributions that
Chomsky has made to linguistic theory. It seems to work because the physical
realisations of all entities appear to be individual in nature. That holds in general,
and for linguistics it seems to imply that it is individual language users that
are the core entities that linguistic theory should be concerned with. Thus the
individualism appears to guarantee ontological homogeneity, and thereby it also
seems to guarantee explanatory unication.
As we have argued elsewhere,12 some strong idealisations, in particular the
competence – performance distinction, are needed to make this work in the case of
language. However, as pointed out above, the argumentation for these assumptions
is conceptual, and not (or at least not exclusively) empirical. And that suggests
12 Cf., Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a, section 8).
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that at least in linguistics this form of naturalism is ideologically motivated. It
is not based on empirical arguments for methodological monism, nor does it give
a sound empirical argumentation for the necessity of methodological individualism.
Rather, these two crucial assumptions are embraced on the basis of what ultimately
is a scientistic ideology.13
6 Naturalism: an alternative view
At this point it might be good to pause for a moment and ask ourselves what this
scientistic form of naturalism has bought us in linguistics, and whether there might
be an alternative way of being a naturalist and a linguist.
As for the rst question, we would venture that the answer is: ‘Actually, not that
much.’ It is true that linguistics enjoys considerable academic prestige, and in part
(but admittedly, only in part) this is due because it conceives itself, and is conceived
by others, as being the most scientic (rigorous, formal, . . . ) of the humanities.
The adoption of a naturalistic stance no doubt contributes to that. But in actual
practice it has led, or so we would argue, initially to an unjustied restriction of
the domain of inquiry, and later, when those restrictions became too stringent,
to a confusing variety of approaches and methodologies. The continuing adherence
to individualism and the model of hypothetico-structural explanation have played
a major role here.
13 To further counterbalance the impression that we are only after Chomsky, or generative grammar, we
illustrate very briey how similar ideas have crept into our own work in semantics. In our use
of the event calculus, which uses closed world reasoning in the description and explanation of a range
of phenomena, from tense and aspect to coercion and logical reasoning, some assumptions about
individualism and materialism can be discerned. Cf., the following passage from Stenning & van
Lambalgen (2008, p. 161–162):
Systems of closed-world reasoning are logics of planning. [. . . ] Maintaining a model of the
current state of the immediate environment relevant to action is a primitive biological
function. [. . . ] The planning logics are just as much what one needs for planning low-level
motor actions such as reaching and grasping, as they are for planning chess moves.
Approaching from the direction of the syntactic and semantic analysis of temporal ex-
pressions of natural languages also directs attention to planning as underlying our faculties
for language. More generally, a main human brain innovation is the increase in neocortex,
and specically in frontal areas of neocortex.These frontal areas are involved in planning
and ‘executive functions’, among other things.
Clearly the assumptions that are operative here are that language originates from non-linguistic
structural properties of the human brain; and that, hence, core aspects of linguistic meaning can
be explained in terms of such individual structural properties.
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But what about the second question, about the possibility of an alternative? If we
bracket our commitment to individualism combined with hypothetic-structural
explanation, the most intuitive way of explaining the human ability to use language
would seem to be one that proceeds in terms of dispositional properties of language
users. Instead of postulating ‘underlying’ structural properties that explain what
we can observe about language and its use, — a postulate that would seem to
bring along a mechanistic picture of language and language users —, we would try
to explain what we can observe in terms of dispositions to verbal and relevant
non-verbal behaviour that are triggered in a complex setting of natural, individual,
and social conditions.
Such a dispositional account has a number of attractive features. First, it would
provide an intuitive account of the voluntary nature of language use. This in-
tentional aspect is hard to give a place in the structure-based, mechanistic view, but
comes natural in a dispositional account. After all, dispositions need additional
conditions to manifest themselves, and an intentional volitional act would appear
to be a prime candidate for such a condition. (Which is not to say that it would be a
necessary condition.)
Secondly, it would provide space to accommodate a number of factors other than
the individual itself that play a role in a comprehensive account of language
and language use. One example here would the communicative purposes of
language users, that are relevant input for determining the manifestations of
their dispositions to use language. That is still at the level of language users and
their interactions. But the dispositional view could also accommodate other factors,
such as external determinants of (lexical) meaning, or institutions and other social
entities. Since the manifestation of a disposition is something that ‘takes place’, i.e.,
is a spatio-temporally located event, the role of both physical and social reality as
(co)determining meaning can be incorporated in a fairly straightforward manner.
And thirdly, unlike the competence – performance distinction, which isolates
competence from performance limitations, such as constraints on working memory,
or limited attention span, the dispositional view prepares a natural setting for such
limitation to operate in. After all, as noted above, the manifestations of a disposition
take place in concrete situations, and features of these situations may not only
contribute to the content of these manifestations, they may also set limits to them,
in various ways.
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So, all in all, it seems much more intuitive to look at what is individual about
language and language use in terms of dispositions than in terms of structure,
and to account for them as embedded in a rich and varied social ontology.
However, enter the commitment to hypothetico-structural explanation, again. It
is this commitment, that postulates that, ‘in the end’, explanations will refer only to
structural properties, that forces us to consider an explanation in dispositional
terms as ‘provisional’, at best. If not outright non-explanatory,14 then minimally
these are explanations that contain terms, viz., the ones referring to dispositions,
that will need to be analysed further until they are eliminated and only reference to
structure and structural priorities remains.15 And this is because, so the argument
goes, structure is real and dispositions are not.
As was already mentioned, a key element in the justication for this assumption,
and hence for the commitment to hypothetico-structural explanations, is the
conviction that physics works that way. And given that physics is the most
successful scientic discipline there is, the idea is that linguistics should follow its
lead. This raises two questions. First of all, does physics really work that way? And
secondly, and this is an issue that is quite independent from the answer to the
previous question, what is the justication for linguistics to follow suit?16
The first question is a complicated one. The idea that structural explanations
are the nec plus ultra of all scientific inquiry is based on what is often called the
‘Groundedness Thesis’, i.e., the view that all dispositions are ultimately grounded in
structural properties of the entities involved. As said physics is often assumed to
conform to this assumption, but there are dissenting voices. More specifically, it
has been argued that at the level of quantum phenomena we find properties that are
14 Arguments to that eect are, by the way, more often than not quite rhetorical in nature, and consist
mainly of obligatory references to the circular nature of, e.g., an explanation of the eect of opium in
terms of its ‘dormative’ power.
15 Getting rid of the non-individual entities would be another task.
16 It is good to note at this point that although naturalism is very much the default position among
linguists in the generative tradition, there are exceptions. An example is provided by Hinzen
and Uriagereka, who defend a non-naturalistic interpretation along the following lines (Hinzen
& Uriagereka 2006, p 71–72):
In our view the metaphysics of linguistics points to a radically dierent ontology of the
mind that invites a rather novel reection on the constraints that delimit the human
conceptual edice, and which to this day have no plausible biological or even physical
explanation. As a consequence of that, the human faculty poses much the same explanatory
problems for contemporary physicalism as the mathematical faculty does.
This is an unorthodox position that deserves further scrutiny. Unfortunately to do so is beyond
the scope of this paper and has to be deferred to another occasion.
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inherently dispositional, i.e., not reducible to structural properties that can serve
as their causal basis. One example is spin of an electron. Cf., Bigaj (2012, p. 212):
Orthodox quantum mechanics does not seem to identify any property which
could play the role of the causal basis for spin.
But also position arguably needs to be considered as a disposition, rather than
a classical property, in view of the probabilistic nature of quantum phenomena. In
fact, this holds across the board, given the very nature of quantum phenomena
(Bigaj 2012, p. 214)]:
The dispositional interpretation of quantum properties is a direct consequence
of the probabilistic character of quantum states.
Thus the dening characteristic of quantum theory, viz., it is inherently probabilistic
character, enforces a dispositional view of its basic objects and their properties.
And according to some this even applies to the very existence of quantum objects.
Cf., Thompson (1988, p. 77):17
In quantum eld theory (a more complete form of quantum physics), even the
existence of objects is a dispositional property that may or may not be manifested,
as, for example, pairs of particles and anti-particles may or may not be formed.
So, taking the lead of science does not force one to do away with dispositions: even the
most fundamental theory of physics does not obey the model of hypothetic-structural
explanation, because, as one might put it, ‘physical reality is dispositional’.
Now this view on physics and its explanatory model is not uncontroversial,
and one might very well maintain that ultimately a fully explanatory theory of
the physical world must satisfy the Groundedness Thesis. Which brings us to
the second question raised above: Even if physics could rely solely on structural
explanations, what reason is there to think that linguistics can too? In order to
answer this question, we need to take a step back and look at what motivates
naturalism in the rst place.
7 The basic claim of naturalism
The core of the naturalistic stance, i.e., the assumption that dierent forms of
naturalism all subscribe to, is that there are no supernatural entities that we
17 Cf., also Suarez (2007) for some further discussion.
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need to appeal to in the construction of adequate, explanatory theories of natural
phenomena. Or, to put it in the form of a slogan: ‘Nature can be explained on
its own terms.’
The reasons for making this claim fall in two broad categories. One is onto-
logical/metaphysical: we need not appeal to supernatural entities because such
entities do not exist, i.e., they are not part of the ontological furniture of the world.
The other is epistemological/methodological: an appeal to supernatural entities is
not needed because such entities do not appear in our explanations, i.e., they do not
belong to the ontological furniture of our theory of the world. These two types of
motivation are not completely independent, of course.
But what counts as a supernatural entity? One way to dene the concept would
be to give a list of what it applies to, i.e., a list of supernatural entities that have
been assumed, conceptualised, or otherwise ‘identied’ over the ages. It would
contain not only well-known concepts from religion, magic and kindred realms, but
also some that did occur in scientic explanations at some point in time: phlogiston,
vital force, . . . . Such an enumeration suggests also a more general characterisation,
which typically proceeds in terms of what a supernatural entity is not:
x counts as a supernatural entity if and only if x lacks relevant features of physical
entities, such as having material constitution, being situated in space-time, being
subject to laws, . . .
To be sure, this is still a fairly general and ‘open’ characterisation, but it will do to
illustrate that the driving force behind naturalism, at least initially, is to avoid
ontological and/or epistemological excess. What does not share basic characteristics
with what nature has on oer does not belong to nature but is (or rather: would be)
of an entirely dierent order.
The reference to physical entities in this characterisation might suggest that
naturalism and physicalism, which holds that all sciences can be reduced, in some
sense, to physics, are actually two sides of the same coin, but that would be too
hasty a conclusion. For note that being a naturalist comes with the commitment to
eschew reference to supernatural entities, not with the much stricter injunction to
refer only to physical entities. What makes its appearance in one’s naturalistic
explanations must have a physical realisation, but that falls short, or so we will
argue, of being a physical entity.
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8 Two avours of naturalism
In order to bring out the dierence we distinguish between two types of naturalism:
conservative, and liberal.18
Conservative naturalism represents the more strict view that not only all natural
entities need to have physical realisations, but that all entities are indeed physical
entities. It is in that respect that liberal naturalism takes a dierent stance: it
agrees with conservative naturalism that all entities need physical realisations, but
nevertheless maintains that not all such entities are therefore physical entities, or
can be reduced to such entities. In other words, liberal naturalism leaves open
the possibility that there are natural entities that are not 100% physical in this
sense that, although they do depend on physical entities that realise them, they can
nevertheless not be reduced to their physical realisations.
It will be clear from the above that there are natural anities between conserva-
tive naturalism and ontological monism, in particular physicalism, and, in its wake,
with methodological monism and explanatory monism. The conservative naturalist
position is indeed, as De Caro and MacArthur quite rightly note, a classical one.
It is strongly committed to the ‘unied science’ ideal of logical positivism in a
physicalistic form: there are no other entities than physical objects and their
properties and relations; everything natural can ultimately be viewed in just those
terms; and hence it is the methodological and explanatory canon of physics that
denes the scientic enterprise as a whole.
Liberal naturalism, on the other hand, embodies a specic kind of ontological
pluralism. It does not recognise any supernatural entities, since it abides with the
core commitment of a naturalistic stance. But it does allow natural entities to come
in dierent kinds which are not reducible one to the other. So liberal naturalism
subscribes to ontological pluralism within the natural world: it recognises dierent
kinds of natural entities as entities in their own right. With that comes the
possibility of methodological and explanatory pluralism: ontological pluralism can
not rule out, but it does not imply it either of course, that the study of dierent kinds
of natural entities calls for dierent methodologies, and also that these dierent
kinds of entities need to be explained in dierent ways.
18 ‘Conservative naturalism’ comes close to what is also called ‘classical’ or ‘scientic’ naturalism;
cf., De Caro & MacArthur (2004).
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It will be clear what determines the choice between conservative and liberal
naturalism: Are there natural phenomena that require for their proper explanation
reference to entities that need physical realisations, so are not supernatural, but
that can not be exhaustively characterised in terms of their physical realisations
and their properties? If no, than conservative naturalism is a viable stance; if yes,
then liberal naturalism is vindicated.
In the next section we will give a number of examples from a variety of disciplines
that suggest that, yes, such entities do exists, and that hence, no, conservative
naturalism is not a viable option in those disciplines. Moreover, we claim that
linguistics is one of these disciplines, so after this brief review we will go into
the question what this means for linguistics as a discipline.19
9 Groups on active duty: some examples
The rst two examples come from biology. The rst concerns the role that groups
might play as vehicles of selection in the evolutionary process. Where the standard
conception of evolution views individuals as the sole instruments in the selection
process, some have argued that we need also to take into account the groups
to which individuals belong, since the eects of behaviour on groups may be
signicant, and hence groups themselves may act as selection vehicles as well.
Although the idea of group selection was entertained by Darwin, it had fallen
in disrepute for a long time. It was revived by Wilson and Sober some twenty
years ago, and since then it has been the subject of a lively debate. This is how
Wilson and Sober motivate the idea in one of their earliest papers (Wilson & Sober
1994, p. 605–606):
There are compelling intellectual and practical reasons to distinguish between be-
haviours that succeed by contributing to group-level organisation and behaviours
that succeed by disrupting group-level organisation. [. . . ] A concern for within-
group versus between-group processes characterises the human mind and should
characterise the study of the human mind as well.
Since its original formulation, the theory of group selection has gone through some
revisions and the debate about has not subsided. But the point for our discussion is
19 To avoid misunderstanding, the examples from other disciplines serve to illustrative the viability of
liberal naturalism as such, not as (additional) arguments for a liberal naturalistic stance in linguistics.
Whether the latter is plausible or not does not depend on the former, of course.
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that if this is on the right track, then selection is a ‘multi-level’ process. It involves
not just individuals, but also groups, which hence have to be regarded as basic,
non-reducible entities: physically realised in their constitutive individuals, but
nevertheless with properties of their own.
The second example from biology concerns trait inheritance. Again, the standard
theory is individualistic, as it locates the inheritance mechanisms solely in the
individual genome, and thus considers that to be the only relevant factor for
phenotypic expression. However, this view arguably ignores the obvious and
important role of other contributing factors. This is how Dupré characterises the
situation (Dupré 2014, p. 81–82):
To expect in general that identiable bits of the genome will have privileged re-
lations to particular traits of the phenotype, given that they do not typically even
have unique relations to particular functional proteins, would be hopelessly unre-
alistic.The notion of the genome as composed of a series of genes ‘for’ particular
phenotypic traits has gone the way of phlogiston. [. . . ] The classicatory divi-
sion of the genome within genomics proper, therefore, is one driven very much
by theoretical considerations, and is little eected by social factors in the inter-
esting sense of ‘social’. If genomics eventually gives us a good understanding of
development, then we might expect to derive real abilities to control developmen-
tal outcomes, human and otherwise. But given the demonstrable complexity of
development and of its joint dependence on internal and environmental factors,
the task is a daunting one.
This goes against a widespread belief that phenotypic expression of inherited traits
is a matter of the individual only, whereas it is quite obvious that environmental
factors of various kinds also play a key role.20 And it seems quite likely that among
these environmental factors are entities that are not individual in nature, such
as kinship and other social groups, economic and social institutions, and so on.
Other scientic disciplines also provide arguments against the individualistic
bias that is a characteristic feature of conservative naturalism. For example, in
20 On the widespread nature of the individualistic bias, cf., Lobo & Shaw (2008):
In an age in which scientists and the public are excited about the sequencing of the entire
human genome, we need to temper that excitement, at least a little, and be careful not
to believe all the hype surrounding genes’ involvement in determining development and be-
haviour. While an organism’s genetic makeup plays a critical role in its development, there
is also a rich and complex interplay between the genome and cues from the environment.
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economics and decision theory the importance of the role of groups, in particular
of such factors as group knowledge and rationality, group intentionality and action,
is increasingly acknowledged. And more and more it becomes clear that the group
properties mentioned can not always be reduced to their individual counterparts.
Witness the ‘Diversity Prediction Theorem’, a mathematical result concerning the
accuracy of group and individual prediction:21
The squared error of the collective prediction equals the average squared error
minus the predictive diversity
What this says is that the prediction of the group as a whole becomes better as
the diversity of the predictions of its members increases. Again, what we have here
is a property of an entity that can not be reduced to properties of its constitutive
members, which means that groups as entities need to be taken on board. And
unlike its conservative counterpart, liberal naturalism allows for that.
And then of course there is an entire tradition in the social sciences that is
naturalistic in its basic stance, yet embraces a social ontology in which such
entities as communities, institutions, practices, and the like play an essential role.
That tradition has many dierent faces, as the works of authors such as Foucault,
Bourdieu, Giddens, Schatzki, and many others illustrates. But they all subscribe
to the starting point that was formulated already in the nineteenth century by
one of the founders of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim (Durkheim 1895):
Here, then, is a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they
consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual,
which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control
over him. Consequently, since they consist of representations and actions, they
cannot be confused with organic phenomena, nor with psychical phenomena,
which have no existence save in and through the individual consciousness. Thus
they constitute a new species and to them must be exclusively assigned the term
social. It is appropriate, since it is clear that, not having the individual as their
substratum, they can have none other than society, either political society in its
entirety or one of the partial groups that it includes – religious denominations,
political and literary schools, occupational corporations, etc.
We take it that these examples, coming from a range of dierent elds, though
not always uncontroversial within the respective disciplines, do illustrate the point
21 Cf., Page (2007).
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that the strict conservative naturalism that many would subscribe to as a matter
of course is not the only option, and in some cases arguably not the right one.
Liberal naturalism seems the way to go.
10 And in linguistics, too
In this section we list just a few of the many phenomena that substantiate the claim
that what was claimed in the previous section holds for linguistics as well. The
point here is not to introduce anything new, as these phenomena are well-known
and extensively studied. Rather it is to emphasise that social entities, used here as a
catch-all phrase to refer to groups, communities, social practices, institutions, and
sundry entities, play a key role in an account of them. And that means that if
we are to explicate the ontological implications of such accounts in a naturalistic
setting we need a liberal naturalism.
First of all, there is the area of speech act theory from which reference to
institutions and institutional practices can not be eliminated. Despite the fact
that in most classical formulations the focus in the analysis of linguistic actions,
and of the intentionality that is involved in them, remains at the individual level,
it is also true that the institutional level is a necessary ingredient of a proper
understanding of many speech acts. A similar argument can be made for the
analysis of linguistic performativity, which also requires the acknowledgement of
institutional frameworks. The ensuing ontological diversity is usually not spelled
out very explicitly, but it is there.
A second example comes from semantics, and is provided by various forms
of semantic externalism and by the phenomenon of the division of linguistic labour.
By its very presuppositions, semantic externalism is at odds with the cognitivist
conception of meaning that locates meaning in the individual’s mind (or brain,
as the case may be). It brings in other factors that co-determine meaning, such
as the physical world in the case of natural kind terms, or the social or cultural
environment in other cases. Especially the latter are hard to account for on a
strictly individual basis. And the same holds for the phenomenon of division of
linguistic labour, with it associated references to dierent subgroups in a linguistic
community. The commitment to a social ontology and the concomitant failure of a
conservative naturalistic stance may not always be very clear from the formal
accounts that have been proposed, but they are there.
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At the interface between semantics and pragmatics we nd a third phenomenon:
that of meaning contextualism. The assumption of stable (‘literal’) meanings is
a prerequisite for the classical individualistic sender – receiver model of linguistic
communication to make sense. It does provided that meanings can be regarded
as individual assets. For only on that assumption does it make sense that meanings
are used (expressed, transmitted) in context. But if meanings themselves depend
on context, such an account is no longer an option. Meaning contextualism
reverses the order of explanation: it is not individual, stable meanings that explain
communication, rather it is the other way around, it is communicative practices
that produce meanings that have (limited) stability. This is how Medina puts it
(Medina 2004, p. 571):
[S]emantic determinacy is the always fragile and relative accomplishment of com-
municative interactions which rest on a tacit agreement in action that is always
undergoing transformation. Meanings become contextually determinate through
the practical consensus achieved by participants in situated linguistic interactions
against the background of shared practices.
And again, it is only when we spell out meaning contextualism that we nd that we
can not make do with a strictly individualistic model, but that we need to accept
communicative practices and the communities in which they exists as bona de
denizens of our theoretical framework. The point can be strengthened further
by pointing to such a phenomenon as successful communication with incomplete
understanding. Just like the phenomena just mentioned this is something that
lies outside the grasp of a linguistic theory that embraces conservative naturalism
and its strict individualism.22
22 At this point it may be good to point out that in many explicitly non-Chomskyean paradigms, in which
semantics and pragmatics are considered to be intrinsic parts of linguistic theory, methodological
individualism still plays a role. Here is an example from construction grammar, cf., the following
passage in Goldberg (1995):
Theorists working in this theory [i.e., construction grammar, ms-mvl] share an interest in
characterising the entire class of structures that make up language, not only the structures
that are dened to be part of ‘core grammar’. This interest stems from the belief that
fundamental insights can be gained from considering such non-core cases, in that the
theoretical machinery that accounts for non-core cases can be used to account for core cases.
[. . . ] Construction Grammarians also share an interest in accounting for the conditions
under which a given construction can be used felicitously, since this is take to be part of the
speakers’ competence or knowledge of language; from this interest stems the conviction
that subtle semantic and pragmatic factors are crucial to understanding the constraints on
grammatical constructions.
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11 Liberal naturalism and the dispositional view
So it seems that a comprehensive account of language needs the liberal natural-
istic perspective, i.e., a framework that can accommodate both individual and
social dimensions of language and language use, and that is not committed to
the hypthetico-structuralist model as the only respectable type of explanation,
and that thus makes room for the incorporation of dispositional properties at the
individual level and for social entities as autonomous elements in its ontology.
Of course groups, social practices, and so on, are not not supernatural entities,
they have physical realisations in the natural world. What is important to note
here is that, in general, the physical realisations of these social entities are not
ontologically homogeneous. In some cases, specic parts of such a realisation may
be identied with individual language users. But others pertain to quite dierent
kinds of entities, such as implements, historical records, spatial congurations, and
other material aspects. And yet others need to be explained in terms of properties
of collectives, such as group intentionality and group knowledge.
This has important consequences, since it paves the way for ontological plu-
ralism, viz., the acknowledgement of dierent categories of natural entities that are
irreducible one to the other. Reduction of behavioural and psychological properties
of groups and institutions and their practices, to properties of the individuals that
realise them is not always possible. And even the individual behavioural and
psychological properties that are involved cannot be reduced, as conservative natu-
ralism would require, to underlying structural properties at the neurophysiological
level, at least not in a signicant sense.
Thus the picture that emerges is pluralistic in a number of ways. First of
all, it comprises dierent kinds of individual entities, not just human language
users. Second, it acknowledges collectives of such individuals, such as linguistic
communities, as entities in their own right. And thirdly, it allows not just for
the structural properties of the entities involved to play an explanatory role, but
also for their dispositions.
This requires an explanatory model that can integrate these various aspects
in such a way that the dierent components and their interactions can all be
Obviously, the scope of linguistic theory as it is conceived of here is wider than in the generative
paradigm. But note that the central role of the individual is still present: linguistic competence
may be a more encompassing notion but it still remains an individual aair
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accounted for. An example of such a model, taken from Vanderbeeken & Weber
(2002), is given in gure 1.
     triggering causes: 
    Situation of type S 
Behavior    
  
structuring causes: 
    Disposition D 
 
 
specifying D:             explaining D:  remote causes 
• social history 
• biological history 
• personal history 
internal causal basis 
•mental terms 
•naturalistic terms 
Figure 1: Dispositions in explanations
Not only does a model such as this make room for dispositions as an explanatory
factor, it also allows for an account of the complex interactions between different
kinds of causal factors, among which are dispositions, structural factors, and en-
vironmental factors. A model along these lines thus seems much more adequate
for dealing with the rich and varied phenomena that language and language use are.
12 The role of linguistic theory in liberal naturalism
But what, one may (and should) ask, is the role of linguistic theory in such a
complex model?
Marr (Marr 1977) usefully distinguished between two types of theories of cogni-
tive phenomena. ‘Type 1’ theories are theories in which one can distinguish Marr’s
famous three levels. The top level is like the competence models of linguistics
– it species in mathematical terms the inputs and outputs of a cognitive process
(such as, on one view, language production and comprehension) viewed as an
information processing task. Once the top level is specied one can construct
algorithms meeting the specications and compare these algorithms with respect
to neural implementability. It is characteristic of a type 1 theory that its inputs and
outputs can be described formally, and this makes it doubtful whether linguistics
can be regarded as a type 1 theory. Before we substantiate these doubts, we quote
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Marr’s very interesting description of the alternative, ‘type 2’ theories, which apply
when (Marr 1977, pp. 38–39):
[. . . ] a problem is solved by the simultaneous action of a considerable number of
processes, whose interaction is its own simplest description.[. . . ] At each moment
only a few of the possible interactions will be important, but the importance of
those few is decisive. Attempts to construct a simplied theory must ignore some
interactions; but if most interactions are crucial at some stage [. . . ] a simplied
theory will prove inadequate.
Indeed, in language comprehension, the input may itself be the product of interact-
ing processes, in the following sense: a piece of discourse may seem uninterpretable
gibberish (even though not obviously ungrammatical), until interaction with a
non-verbal information source restores sense to the discourse. A classic example
of this phenomenon is the experiment in Bransford & Johnson (1972), in which
subjects were presented with the following discourse, supposedly from a man
muttering to himself:
If the balloons popped, the sound wouldn’t be able to carry since everything
would be too far away from the correct oor. A closed window would also prevent
the sound from carrying, since most buildings tend to be well insulated. Since the
whole operation depends on a steady ow of electricity, a break in the middle of
the wire would also cause problems. Of course, the fellow could shout, but the
human voice is not loud enough to carry that far. An additional problem is that a
string could break on the instrument. Then there could be no accompaniment to
the message. It is clear that the best situation would involve less distance. Then
there would be fewer potential problems. With face to face contact, the least
number of things could go wrong.
Some subjects were shown gure 2 before they had to interpret the discourse.
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Figure 2: A modern serenade
These subjects could adequately recall and summarise the discourse. By contrast,
subjects who were shown the picture after the discourse or not all, were unable
to summarise or even recall the discourse. Thus the hearer must have access to
the speaker’s ‘situation model’ to be able to interpret the discourse. Realistically,
this means that the hearer, starting from a few clues concerning the speaker’s
situation model, elaborates the situation model and interprets the discourse in
an interactive and defeasible manner. Since making the picture available after the
speaker has stopped talking does not benet the hearer, processing must obey the
‘principle of immediacy’ , i.e., ‘all available information will immediately be used to
co-determine the interpretation of the speaker’s message’ (Hagoort & Berkum 2007,
p. 801). If one adopts this processing principle, linguistics cannot be a type 1 theory.
13 Conclusion
Although much more detail needs to be added, we do think that the considerations
given in this paper support the conclusion that an adequate account of language
and language use needs a liberal naturalistic perspective. The main reason is
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that language manifests itself in categorically distinct ontological entities, and
methodological individualism does not succeed in constructing an ontologically
homogeneous base for this variety. We have to accept that language is ontologically
heterogenous and explanatorily not uniform. And the way in which a conservative
naturalistic view is defended in the literature supports the claim that theories that
aim to give a uniform explanation based on a homogeneous ontology are informed
by some form of ideologically informed reductionism.
An alternative, liberal naturalistic view, which is ontologically, methodological
and explanatory heterogeneous seems to be called for, and a dispositional account
of several aspects of language and language use needs to be incorporated in such a
view. The role of linguistic theory in this alternative view is to provide a systematic
description of certain properties of linguistic expressions that can be part of such
an encompassing account of language and its use. This means that linguistic theory
must be viewed as one methodology among many, that deals with one particular
aspect among many, of a heterogeneous phenomenon. Viewed in this way linguistic
theory oers a conceptual reconstruction of certain aspects of language that also
may suggest further empirical investigations. That is an important element of
our investigations, but not the nal word: linguistic theory is not an explanatory
theory of a distinct empirical phenomenon.
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